Revenge Of The Jihadi
I think their fundamental weakness stems from the undoubted fact that Bush et al are profoundly regressive and hierarchical people. Thus, they think in terms of cohorts and divisions, leaders, and roles. They think — or they know their supporters think and tell them what they want to hear — that they can somehow “end terrorism” through the elimination of identified “leaders”. I think that’s bogus, it betrays a profound lack of understanding of the nature of smart mobs (leadership roles as situtated, contextual, emergent, and transitory) and ideological drivers, and I’m not the only one.
The spate of attacks and threatened attacks last week owed less to ‘the return of al-Qaeda’, as trumpeted by some headlines, and more to a broad-based Islamic militant movement that is growing in strength everywhere between Malaysia and Morocco. Those involved may share many of the aims of bin Laden and his associates, they may even accept temporary help from experienced senior individual activists, but they are not part of his group. They do not carry membership cards, they have not taken any oath of allegiance. If these groups, cells and individuals are part of al-Qaeda, they are merely part of an ‘al-Qaeda movement’ not any structured, hierarchical organisation. This movement is as diverse as the many countries from which its members come.